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Karachi is not only the largest metropolis of Pakistan and its commercial hub, it is also known 
as a ‘mini-Pakistan’.  This is a reference to the ethnic and religious diversity of Karachi’s 
population.  It has been a city of migrants for as long ago as anyone cares to remember.  Until 
the 1980s it also shared, along with Lahore, the status of the political pulse of the country, or 
at least of the urban parts of Pakistan.  To succeed nationally, movements had to make a mark 
on the city, and currents that emerged in Karachi frequently influenced the national 
mainstream. The very features of Pakistani society that are represented so prominently in 
Karachi are the ones that are often thought to challenge the coherence and stability of the 
nation state.  Foremost, of course, are ethnic and religious sectarian heterogeneity.  But there 
is also political fragmentation, economic disparity, demographic pressures, steady erosion of 
the state’s institutional capacity and the heavy footprint of international conflict.  This paper 
is based on the premise that even as Karachi’s politics were cut off from the national 
mainstream, the city became a vantage point on the crisis of the nation state in Pakistan. 
 
In fact, the city’s exceptionalism since the mid-1980s could be seen as part of a wider process 
of political disarticulation in Pakistan: a disarticulation that at times threatens the basic make-
up of the state.  Yet the state has managed to pull back from the brink on several occasions, 
and so has the city.  A closer look at the city and its own ‘experiments’ with the limits of 
institutional elasticity holds lessons for an understanding of the precarious resilience that has 
characterised the nation state itself in Pakistan.  The aim of this paper is to provide a 
perspective on institutional breakdown in Karachi, using the prevalence of conflict and 
violence – particularly of the civil variety – as an index for this.  
 
The paper begins with a description of the conflict and violence that has become associated 
with Karachi. Trends and patterns in conflict and non-state violence are identified here, as 
outcomes that require explanation.  The second section provides relevant background 
information on the city’s placement within the national polity and economy.  Some of the 
main explanations for Karachi’s trends and patterns of conflict and violence − relating to 
ethnic identity, organisations, economic frustration, and political conspiracies − are reviewed 
in the third section.  The role of external factors such as migration and the influences of the 
war in Afghanistan are also highlighted. An alternative approach focusing on two 
incontrovertible aspects of Karachi’s urbanity – migration and informality − is outlined in the 
fourth section.   It is proposed here that the analysis of conflict and violence in Karachi can 
benefit from an understanding of the very processes that made Karachi an open city in the 
first place.  The high rate of migration was correlated with an erosion of the formal sector’s 
capacity for supplying basic infrastructure or regulating the use of existing infrastructure.  
This resulted in the rapid growth of an informal sector for the provision of residential land, 
basic public utilities, transport and contract enforcement.  The informalisation of public 
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provisioning, which was often aided and abetted by state organisations, was premised on two 
institutional deviations: first, the large-scale legitimisation of private non-state arrangements 
for contract enforcement; and second, the strengthening of existing or nascent social networks 
based on bonds of family, ethnicity and religious and sectarian identity.  Qualitative accounts 
of the histories of land use in six very different localities of the city are interpreted using this 
alternative approach.  Finally, it is argued that this alternative approach offers a way of 




Conflict and violence 
Current patterns of non-state violence 
Karachi is a busy city that provides sustenance to its 15 million residents through industry, 
trade, commerce, services and charity.  It is also a violent city – probably the most violent city 
of comparable size in South Asia.  In 2001, the murder rate in Karachi was 4.04 per 100,000 
people compared with 1.67 in Mumbai and 3.79 in Delhi (CPLC 2009). Between 1994 and 
2004, there were 8,816 casualties reported through incidents of violence including murders, 
torture by non-state actors, kidnappings for ransom, vigilante reprisals, bombings and suicide 
attacks.1  There are estimated to be a significant number of lethal weapons, many of them 
unlicensed and illegally held, in private hands in Karachi.2 
 
These statistics, however, do not fully convey many of the paradoxes of Karachi’s non-state 
violence.  The capacity for violent disruption that lurks just beneath the surface manifests 
itself at rare instances when the city is brought to a grinding halt by one of it several 
claimants.  Otherwise it is business as usual, with traffic jams, bustling markets, late night 
shopping and dining, drives by the sea front, and an infectious carefree mood.  There are few 
‘no-go’ areas in the city, and hardly any neighbourhoods that are normally ‘closed’ to the 
entry of ethnic or religious outsiders.  Yet it takes only a rumour for the shutters to go down, 
and for any locality to turn inwards on those occasions when the situation becomes abnormal.  
There have been days when pitched battles have raged between armed groups – divided along 
party-political, ethnic or gang lines – throwing up temporary fronts across otherwise invisible 
and well-traversed boundaries.  Those days are not common, but everyone seems to know that 
they could come at short notice. 
 
Specifically, there are currently several identifiable proximate sources of non-state violence in 
Karachi.  First, a number of political parties operating in the city maintain armed cadres who 
are organised and trained in the use of lethal weapons.  Inter-party violence has tended to flare 
up around particular events such as public meetings, rallies and elections.  There are also 
underlying tensions between political groups that are blamed for targeted killings of rival 
members and armed cadres.  These groups are discussed in greater detail below, but it needs 
to be noted that their activities are not directly linked to jihadi forms of religious extremism. 
 
Second, the use of firearms is common in a range of crimes including robberies, carjackings, 
vehicle thefts, burglaries, drugs trafficking, protection rackets and kidnappings for ransom.  It 
is presumed that all of these types of crimes involve some level of organisation and networks.  
There are allegedly close connections between criminal and party-political networks.  In some 
                                                 
1 Authors’ estimates based on annual reports of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan  (HRCP 1994-2004). 
2 Between 1993 and 1996, firearms were the agent of injury/death for 3,392 victims (Chotani et al. 2002) 
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parts of the metropolis, such as the old city quarter of Lyari, rival gang leaders have had 
relations with various party factions.  In other cases it is alleged that the local armed cadres of 
some parties are directly involved in organising crimes and protecting petty criminals.  Some 
conspicuous cases of kidnapping for ransom have been linked with powerful rural patrons. 
 
Third, there have been acts of violence that are thought to be linked to jihad and religious 
extremism.3  Most of the known groups connected with jihadi violence belong to the Sunni 
Deobandi sect – even though there are many Sunni Deobandi clerics and organisations that do 
not support jihadi violence within Pakistan. There have been several suicide bomb attacks on 
local and foreign targets that have claimed the lives of many civilians since 2001.  Many of 
the now-proscribed jihadi groups that have been declared terrorist organisations have had a 
presence in Karachi (Newsline, August 2003).  It is alleged that the US journalist Daniel Pearl 
was abducted and murdered by an Al-Qaeda cell operating in the city, and it is possible that 
there are other such cells that remain hidden.  Before 2001 the main public activity of the 
religious extremists groups in the city was to raise funds and to recruit members through the 
many mosques and seminaries.  These groups were also alleged to have carried out bombing 
and assassination campaigns against the Shia Muslim community that is present in large 
numbers in Karachi (Newsline, July 2002). 
 
A brief chronology 
There has been a steady escalation in violence in Karachi – led by political violence – since 
the early 1970s.  Up until then political, student and trade-union activity was largely peaceful 
and violence was limited to isolated brawls that rarely led to a casualty.  The main source of 
violence during such movements was the police, and on rare occasions the military that were 
called in to quell agitation.  Sectarian religious violence between Sunni and Shia mobs did 
take place occasionally, but this posed a security challenge only on particular days in the year 
when religious marches of rival sects happened to cross each others’ paths.  Much earlier in 
the late 1940s the city had witnessed communal violence against the minority Hindu 
community, most of whose members were forced to flee to India (Khuhro 1998). 
 
The first political movement during which non-state actors – mostly mobs of youths – used 
any significant amount of violence was in the early 1970s when the newly-elected provincial 
assembly of Sindh passed a law requiring the teaching of the Sindhi language in all 
educational institutes (Pakistan Forum 1972).  This was seen by many members of the Urdu-
speaking majority of Karachi as an assault on their cultural and political position in the 
province and the city (Rashid and Shaheed 1993).  There were cases of ethnic violence as 
well as other acts of mob violence, but the situation was quickly brought under control 
through enforcement and political negotiation (Rahman 1995). 
 
Sustained mobilisation followed elections in 1977, which the opposition claimed were rigged 
by the government of the populist Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.  As the government 
responded with repression the movement in Karachi turned violent with mob attacks, arson 
and targeting of the government’s political sympathisers and supporters (Weinbaum 1977).  
The PNA movement was, arguably, the last major movement in which Karachi was part of, or 
even led, the national mainstream.  In Karachi the PNA movement (named after the 
opposition Pakistan National Alliance) was headed by right-wing Islamic religious parties that 
                                                 
3 The word jihad literally means struggle in Arabic.  In Pakistan is has come to connote combat in the cause of 
Islam.  It is in this sense that the term jihad is used here. 
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had become implacable foes of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s left-of-centre Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP). 
 
The PNA movement became the pretext for a military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq, and 
he imposed a highly repressive martial law regime that banned political activity.  General 
Zia’s regime faced considerable resistance and he made alliances with religious groups to 
implement Islamic Sharia law.  In Karachi, where opposition to Zia had considerable support 
on college campuses, pro-Zia Islamist groups began to receive weapons and training from 
state agencies.  This was the beginning of the war between Soviet forces in Afghanistan and 
their mujahideen opponents. The Pakistan military’s support for the Afghan jihad had two 
immediate implications for Karachi.  The Islamist groups, particularly the student-based 
Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT), became militarised due to their involvement with the Afghan 
mujahideen, and there was a proliferation of small arms in private hands as weapons destined 
for the Afghan jihad found their way to unregulated arms markets (Tully 1995). 
 
Campus opposition to General Zia and the IJT in Karachi took several forms.  Besides leftists 
groups – such as the various factions of the National Students Federation (NSF) – there were 
a number of ethnically based groups, some of them also with leftist rhetoric, among the 
Baloch, Pashtun Sindhi and other ethnic minorities.  These latter groups saw the Zia regime as 
a manifestation of Punjabi ethnic domination in the country.  Their connections with the rural 
hinterland, particularly in the Pashtun tribal areas, allowed the ethnic groups to also acquire 
weapons in order to stand up to the IJT on the campuses.  The formation of an ethnically 
based group claiming to represent the interests of Karachi’s Urdu-speaking Muhajir 
community completed the picture.4 
 
The All Pakistan Muhajir Students’ Organisation (APMSO), which was to give birth to the 
Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) or the Muhajir national movement, was founded as a rival 
to the IJT.  Although IJT was ethnically diverse, its parent party the Jamaat-e-Islami had a 
strong reserve of support in the Urdu-speaking population of Karachi.  Many of the founders 
of the APMSO were disaffected IJT members, who wanted to replace Islamic solidarity with 
a call to the distinct ethnic identity of the Muhajirs.  The APMSO quickly challenged the IJT 
and seriously undermined the latter by weaning away many of its potential supporters among 
the Muhajirs.  It also followed in the pattern set by the IJT and ethnic student federations in 
acquiring arms.  Campus politics had been steadily militarised, and by the mid-1980s it was 
virtually impossible for unarmed student groups to physically survive in the city’s colleges 
and universities. 
 
The emergence of the MQM from the APMSO meant that the politics of armed cadres left the 
confines of the campuses and entered the communities.  The party had disproportionate 
support among the Muhajir youth, many of whom were attracted to its militant and macho 
reputation.  The idea that the Muhajirs formed a distinct ethnic group – like the Sindhis, 
Punjabis, Balochis and the Pashtuns – became a rallying point.  The organisation took full 
advantage of simmering ethnic resentments among the Muhajirs – many of whom felt 
disenfranchised in ‘their own’ city.  In a series of violent encounters with other ethnic groups, 
particularly the Pashtuns, the MQM established a reputation for militancy (Gayer 2003). 
                                                 
4 The word ‘muhajir’ literally means migrant or refugee, and in the context of Karachi refers to Muslim migrants 
from India who arrived in the city following the bloody partition of the country at the time of independence in 
1947.  Latterly, descendents of the original migrants also began to class themselves as muhajir and argued that 
they formed a distinct ethnic group. The term evokes the Islamic tradition of hijrat, or migration in the face of 
religious persecution.  . 
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The first major ethnic confrontations took place over seemingly innocuous issues.  A hit and 
run incident involving a Pashtun-owned bus and a Muhajir schoolgirl led to widespread riots 
in which large numbers of buses were set alight. Another incident was sparked off by alleged 
sniper fire on an MQM procession from an Afghan refugee neighbourhood.  This also led to 
large-scale rioting in which many people lost their lives and homes were destroyed.  The next 
to flare up was the working class neighbourhood of Orangi where Muhajirs and Pashtuns 
lived in close proximity.  Automatic weapons were used by both sides, and there were a 
number of horrific incidents of people being burnt alive in their homes (Karim 1995).  These 
events marked a qualitative shift in the nature and scale of violence in Karachi: during 1985, 
the Karachi police recorded 608 cases of rioting which claimed 56 lives (Richards 2007).   
 
By 1987 the MQM was ready to contest local elections, and in the national elections that 
followed in 1988 it emerged as an overwhelming victor in Karachi.  Political representation 
did not lead to an abatement of political violence.  On the eve of the 1988 elections there was 
a massacre of Urdu-speaking Muhajirs in a series of random drive-by shootings in the city of 
Hyderabad.  Extreme Sindhi ethnic nationalist groups were widely suspected of carrying out 
this crime.  There was virtually immediate retaliation against Sindhis in Karachi for which the 
MQM was blamed.  Ethnic tensions between Sindhis and Muhajirs remained high even after 
the elections, despite the fact that the MQM and the Sindhi-dominated PPP were coalition 
partners.  The MQM left the coalition in 1989 and this was followed by a period of 
unrelenting political and ethnic violence in Karachi.  A new factor in this phase of violence 
was the abduction of political and ethnic rivals.  Parts of the city started to become ‘no-go’ 
areas for the police and security services, and it was reported that parties operated detention 
centres where victims would be tortured and even executed (HRCP 1992). 
 
From 1990 onwards there were sporadic attempts on the part of the security services to 
confront armed ethnic groups in Karachi, particularly the MQM.  Police action was launched 
in 1990 but was aborted after the military backed away (Ziring 1991).  Another operation, this 
time led by the military itself, was started in 1992 under the cover of a bloody split in the 
ranks of the MQM, but this too got bogged down, apparently due to the lack of good 
intelligence.  From 1993 till 1996 there was an intelligence-led campaign with cooperation 
between police, paramilitary forces and the army to seriously disable the military capacity of 
the MQM.  The state’s action led to mass arrests of MQM members, supporters and their 
family members.  Large number of youths (estimates range between several hundreds and 
several thousands) were killed in actual or faked encounters with the security services (HRCP 
1992-2007).  Many young men escaped and took refuge in rural areas – paradoxically among 
ethnic communities that had themselves been targets of ethnic violence in Karachi.  Others 
fled abroad to the US, UK, South Africa and Malaysia. 
 
MQM resistance was also fierce.  During the early period of the security operations there 
were retaliatory attacks on state-security personnel and on other ethnic groups.  It was 
common to find trussed up dead bodies in gunny sacks with torture marks.  Many of these 
were alleged police informers (HRCP 1996).  The party also retained the ability during that 
time of calling and enforcing general strikes in the city causing serious economic disruption 
and losses.  Many parts of the city witnessed internal displacement as people from the 
‘wrong’ ethnic group were forced to shift to safer neighbourhoods (Khan 2003).  It is 
estimated that hundreds of families of MQM members and supporters – especially those 
families who had lost a member in a police encounter – were forced to go into hiding.  They 
were unable to return to their homes because of fears of police harassment.  There were also 
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demographic shifts within the city as people moved to neighbourhoods in the southern 
districts of the city that were relatively less disrupted by strikes and riots. 
 
It can be argued that the 1993 to 1996 period marked a peak in ethnic conflict and political 
violence of certain types in Karachi.5  Chottani, Razak and Luby (2002) estimate the rate of 
violent injuries to be 23 per 100,000, and the rate of violent deaths to be 13 per 100,000 
between 1993 and 1996.6 Since that period the MQM and other ethnic parties have regrouped, 
rearmed and revived themselves.  They have also displayed, very occasionally, the ability to 
repeat the excesses of the 1990s.  The most notable such event was the violence on May 12, 
2007, which is discussed below. But there are also important changes.  The MQM, for 
example, formally changed its name from Muhajir Quami Movement to the Muttahida Quami 
Movement (United National Movement).  Dropping the ‘Muhajir’ label was seen as an 
important act of symbolism because it allowed the party to claim to be a national rather than 
ethnic party (Richards 2007). 
 
The lowering of ethnic political violence since the late 1990s does not mean that such 
violence has disappeared altogether.  There have been periods when inter-party rivalries have 
led to targeted assassinations of party cadres and supporters.  The link between lower level 
party cadres and criminal elements has also thrived.  Fighting between youth cadres of parties 
is sometimes indistinguishable from gang warfare. 
 
Even though ethnic violence might have abated for now, other forms of violence have 
emerged in recent years.  Between 1994 and 2006, extremist Sunni militants waged a 
campaign of bomb attacks and assassinations against the city’s Shia minority (Abbas 2001).  
A number of mosques and congregations were bombed.  There was a systematic campaign to 
target educated professionals within the Shia community – presumably in the expectation that 
this would lower the community’s morale and encourage its members to seek emigration 
(Korejo 2002).  It is estimated that 26 doctors were assassinated.7  The recent pattern of 
sectarian violence is very different from the Shia-Sunni violence that occurred up until the 
1980s, when rival religious processions might break out into mob attacks and riots. 
 
There is known to be much overlap between groups that target Shias and those who have 
undertaken or supported terrorist attacks on foreign and national targets since 2001.  Targeted 
assassinations thought to be carried out by jihadi groups actually predate 9/11 and the US-led 
war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.  Militant Sunni organisations such as 
the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are known to have had close 
ideological and operational links with jihadi groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (Rana 2004). 
 
The war in Afghanistan and the Pakistan government’s support for the US-led coalition 
produced an angry response in some of the religious circles in Karachi.  There were calls for 
recruitment for jihad and many young men – mostly but not exclusively from ethnic Pashtun 
localities – volunteered to fight alongside the Taliban.  A new dimension was added to the 
pattern of violence in the city, with attacks on foreign and national high value targets.  US 
                                                 
5 According to the authors’ calculations from HRCP annual reports, 4,642 people were killed in shootings, 
encounters and political violence between 1994 and 1996 (see Annex 1). 
6 The authors also determine the nature of violence as being ethnic and politically motivated through gathering 
data from ambulance service logbooks. They found that the number of casualties and injuries increased during 
periods of strikes. Moreover, they discovered that casualties were disproportionately high (in contrast with 
population) in Korangi (22% of all homicides), Malir (8%), Nazimabad (8%) and Orangi (8%). Urdu speakers 
are a majority in Orangi and Nazimabad, while Malir and Korangi are multi-ethnic. 
7 Authors calculations from HRCP annual reports 
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consular personnel and premises were targeted on several occasions by suicide bombers.  
There was a suicide bomb attack on French naval engineers that killed over a dozen people 
(Rana 2004).  There were unsuccessful assassination attempts on important Pakistani 
officials, such as President Musharraf and the army commander of Karachi. 
 
There were also major bomb attacks on public rallies that claimed the lives of hundreds of 
people.  The first was an explosion at a Barelvi Sunni religious gathering in April 2006 that 
eliminated the entire leadership of the Sunni Tehreek (Sunni Movement).  This organisation 
claims to represent the Barelvi Sunnis who distinguish themselves from the Deobandi Sunnis.  
The former focus on ritual and devotion in contrast with the latter who are highly doctrinaire.  
While the Sunni Tehreek is a militant organisation – with armed cadres – it opposes and is 
opposed by the jihadi groups who are mostly Deobandi Sunni (Rana 2004).  On the streets the 
Sunni Tehreek’s main rivalry, however, is not with the jihadi groups but with the nominally 
secular MQM.  This is because many of the Sunni Tehreek cadres are former MQM members 
who split off or were expelled due to infighting (Shah 2003).  The vendetta has been carried 
over into the new organisation.  There were no claims of responsibility on the Sunni Tehreek 
rally, but there was a war of words between the MQM and the supporters of jihadi groups, 
with each shifting the blame on the other. 
 
In October 2007 the public reception for Benazir Bhutto’s return to Pakistan from her ten-
year exile was the target of a major bomb attack.  The attack on Bhutto’s rally, which she 
survived, killed over 130 people and maimed several hundred others.  The attack was blamed 
variously on jihadi groups, Al-Qaeda, Taliban and elements within Pakistan’s security 
apparatus opposed to her policies (Dawn News, October 19, 2007).  In this case too there was 
no admission of responsibility.  After a lull of some two years, a Shia religious processions 
were bombed in December 2009 and February 2010, claiming over sixty lives.  These attacks 
on Shia Muslims were claimed by spokespersons for the Pakistani Taliban. 
 
Summary of trends and patterns 
It is useful to summarise the main trends and patterns of conflict and violence in Karachi.  
The above review has shown that the mid-1980s marked a turning point both in terms of the 
extent and the nature of political violence.  Whereas before, political violence had been 
exceptional and connected to specific policies and actions, now it became widespread and 
systemic.  Political organisations and entire communities became militarised.  Ethnicity was a 
salient line of division, but so was party-political and religious affiliation.  There was a 
blurring of boundaries between political cadres and protection rackets, with the consequence 
that criminal and political violence became indistinguishable.  Organisations acquired the 
capacity to enforce city-wide shut-downs and strikes, and state-security agencies lost their 
overwhelming superiority in the exercise of coercive power. 
 
There are inter-connections between the three broad sources of violence identified above: 
ethnic/party-political conflict, criminal violence and the jihadi threat.  But there are also 
distinctive features.  The jihadi violence has recently consisted of sectarian or high profile 
targeted assassinations, and bomb attacks including suicide bombs.  Ethnic/party-political 
conflicts sometimes take the form of targeted killings but do not involve bomb attacks.  These 
conflicts can and do involve ‘mass’ actions such as shut-downs and strikes, mob violence and 
even territorial battles.  The jihadi violence does not include ‘mass’ or open action, but it can 
include sporadic attempts at enforcing Taliban-style restrictions on music and dress codes in 
selected pockets of the city. 
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This paper takes that view that although jihadi violence is a more urgent threat to state 
security and stability, ethnic/party political and criminal violence, which are inter-connected, 
are more important sources of insecurity and the danger of breakdown in Karachi.  The 
arming of the city, the emergence of identity-based politics, and the weakening of state 
institutions are key shifts since the mid-1980s.  Some of these conditions are the same ones 
that also make Karachi vulnerable to jihadi violence. 
 
Recent city-wide violence 
This chronological review will be incomplete without reference to two recent city-wide acts 
of political violence that revealed the geographical contours of the emerging contest in 
Karachi.  The first was what has come to be known simply as ‘May 12’.  There was 
widespread fighting on that day in 2007 when rallies from different parts of the city heading 
to the airport to receive the deposed chief justice of the country came under attack.  The 
ensuing violence claimed over fifty lives in different parts of the city and left many people 
injured.  There was a virtual shutdown for three days, and a serious danger of the situation 
escalating into an open ethnic conflict.  The second instance was the reaction in Karachi to the 
news of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi in northern Pakistan: widespread 
rioting engulfed the city and there were several deaths; while about thirteen banks were burnt 
or robbed, and fifteen factories, ten petrol pumps and more than seven hundred vehicles 
torched (The News, December 30, 2007). 
 
The then-ruling MQM was widely held responsible for the May 12 events.  The party had 
clearly stated its opposition to the deposed chief justice’s visit to Karachi, and to the lawyer’s 
movement against the Musharraf regime in general.  Opposition parties which then included 
the PPP and the ethnic Pashtun Awami National Party (ANP) were supporting the lawyer’s 
movement, and planned to turn out in large numbers to greet the defiant judge.  The night 
before the judge’s visit MQM cadres were seen setting up road blocks and barricades shutting 
off access to the proposed route of the chief justice’s reception processions.  The city had 
been divided geographically between a central corridor along a north-south axis, and the 
periphery. 
 
On the day itself all state-security forces – police, paramilitaries and army – were conspicuous 
by their absence.  At around midday, the time when the chief justice’s plane landed, there 
were sniper attacks on opposition processions that been stopped at barricades at different 
points in the city.  Many opposition supporters were also armed and there were pitched gun 
battles across the city.  The MQM managed to stop the chief justice’s welcome, thus forcing 
him to return to Islamabad after waiting within the airport for several hours.  Ambushes and 
attacks on processions were well-planned and eyewitness accounts suggest that many of the 
attackers organised into military-style units acting in concert.  In addition to sniping and gun 
battles there were a number of instances of abduction, many of which led to execution-style 
killings (HRCP 2007b). 
 
Although the MQM had an upper hand in terms of scale and organisation of combat, the 
opposition also managed to put up sustained resistance on the streets.  The violence quickly 
spread from the processions to neighbourhoods along a notional front-line that roughly 
corresponded with the boundary between central and outer districts around the city.  MQM 
offices were set alight in the outer districts as well as in cities across the country. 
 
Benazir Bhutto’s assassination on December 27, 2007 provoked an angry response in Karachi 
and other cities of Sindh.  Gangs of youth, many of them armed, spread out from working 
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class neighbourhoods within the city and in the outlying settlements  and there was 
widespread rioting and arson (The News, December 30, 2007).  On this occasion, too, the 
state-security forces were withdrawn from the streets.  Petrol pumps were early targets and 
they remained shut for several days, thus paralysing traffic in the city.  Although many of the 
central precincts of the city were also affected by rioting – and thus remained closed for 
several days – there was a sense of a centre-periphery geographic division.  All of the main 
entry and exit routes serving the city were effectively blockaded, including routes leading to 
the harbour area. 
 
The differences between the two recent city-wide acts of violence are obvious.  The first was 
planned, involved direct confrontation between armed groups, and resulted in high levels of 
casualties but relatively little damage to property.  The second, by contrast, was spontaneous, 
and there was extensive looting and damage to property.  The similarities, however, are 
instructive.  In both cases the main protagonists, at least on the surface, were political parties.  
State-security forces were absent or withdrew, and order was quickly restored when they 
reappeared.  There was a geographic division of the city between the centre and the periphery.  
On both occasions there was a danger that the violence would escalate along ethnic lines, but 
this danger was quickly ameliorated by political parties and leaders through public gestures of 
reconciliation. 
 
Finally, it is striking that the political backdrop of both cases of recent city-wide violence 
were events relating to the national mainstream.  Karachi’s violent response in turn had an 
influence on national politics.  The May 12 violence resulted from MQM’s decision not to 
allow the opposition movement – which had received public support in other parts of the 
country, notably north-central Punjab – to encroach into what the party regarded as its 
territory.  The violence had the opposite effect.  The resistance in Karachi and the casualties 
raised the pitch of the opposition movement and made the government’s position harder to 
defend.  The post-Benazir violence was also a response to an event in national politics.  The 
PPP had been a minor player in the city with its support concentrated in the rural areas and 
smaller towns of Sindh and Punjab.  The scale and spread of violence suggested that 
something might have changed.  Karachi was back in the national mainstream after decades, 
and now in its own violent manner. 
 
Pulling away from the brink? 
The remainder of this paper is not about conflict and violence, but about understanding the 
conditions that may have led to a qualitative change in Karachi’s security environment and its 
isolation from the national mainstream in the mid-1980s.  Karachi’s experience suggests 
another paradox, and thus a potential source of insight.  There are a number of instances – 
some drawn-out and others rapid – when a clear danger of escalation of violence and 
breakdown has been reversed.  The ten-year period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s saw 
dramatic changes in the fortunes and military capacity of the MQM; and there have been 
other periods when criminal violence has peaked and then declined.  The two recent cases of 
city-wide violence offer dramatic windows on instances when escalation was seen as a 
palpable threat and the situation was rapidly brought under control.  Any understanding of 
Karachi’s drift into conflict and non-state violence, therefore, also needs to be able to explain 




Wider context in time and space 
City, province and state 
Karachi was a small port with a natural harbour that was attacked and occupied by British 
troops in 1839.  The Governor of the Talpur Mir rulers of Sindh formally surrendered the 
defences of the city to the East India Company for the purposes of setting up a military base.  
Within four years the British used Karachi as a staging post to defeat the Talpurs and by 1843 
had annexed Sindh to the Bombay Presidency.  Karachi was now administratively rejoined 
with Sindh as its colonial headquarters (Rustomji and Katrak 2007). 
  
In 1936, following a concerted political campaign by the Muslim leadership of Sindh, the 
region was separated from the Bombay Presidency and made into a province of British India, 
with Karachi as its headquarters. The city was already a centre of Sindh’s political activities 
and now hosted the provincial legislature and high court.  There was rapid growth in 
economic activity as a result of the separation from Bombay.  During the two world wars, the 
city also expanded to accommodate soldiers belonging to allied forces that set up bases in 
Karachi, and used the sea and airports for supplies (Rustomji and Katrak 2007).  
 
The city hosted an intricate and detailed administrative system, and this influenced Jinnah’s 
decision in 1947 to choose Karachi as the first capital of Pakistan. Between 1947 to 1954, 
close to one million Urdu-speaking Muslims followed Jinnah to Karachi to make it their 
home in Pakistan. When Karachi was officially declared the capital of Pakistan, the 
constituent assembly decided to separate it from Sindh to make it a federally administered 
area – a move that was resisted by the Sindhi members of the assembly who feared the 
alienation of an important historic heritage and economic resource from their constituencies 
(Ahmed 1998).  Karachi hence became Pakistan’s first Federal Capital Territory.  
 
In 1955, Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and tribal areas 
were combined to form One Unit – i.e. West Pakistan. Lahore was declared provincial capital 
of West Pakistan, while Karachi remained the federal capital. In 1958, the federal government 
decided to move the federal capital to Islamabad (Ansari 2005).  Following opposition 
protests, the One Unit was dissolved in 1969, and Karachi was once against designated capital 
of the newly revived Sindh province.  Between 1958 and 1969 Karachi grew rapidly as an 
industrial powerhouse of Pakistan, but was home to few significant central or provincial 
government offices. 
 
Until 2001, Karachi was an administrative division consisting of several districts, the urban 
segments of which were part of a municipal corporation.  Reforms of local government 
systems in Pakistan, popularly known as the ‘Devolution Plan’, amalgamated the entire 
territory of the former Karachi division into the City District Government of Karachi 
(CDGK), the formal distinction between urban and rural areas was removed and the city 
divided into eighteen towns.  The lowest administrative unit is now the union council, of 
which there are 178 in Karachi. 
 
Economic hub 
Today, Karachi is spread over 3,530 square kilometres and is the largest city (by scale and 
population) in Pakistan.  In 2007, its per capita output exceeded the country’s by 50 percent 
and the province’s by around 80 percent. The city accounts for a third of the total national 
output in large-scale manufacturing, 24 percent in finance and insurance, and 20 percent in 
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transport, storage and communications.8 Karachi is also valued for government-revenue 
generation.  While it accounted for 14.5 percent of domestic output, approximately 54 percent 
of all central government tax revenues were collected here. The city’s monopoly over sea-
bound trade makes it a prime site for the collection of custom duties. Moreover, being the 
point of import/manufacture of a large proportion of the goods that attract sales tax, Karachi 
is a high contributor to national sales tax. Finally, hosting the largest population employed in 
the manufacturing, retail-trading and services sector, Karachi is also the highest contributor to 
the central government’s income-tax revenue. 
 
In some ways the relationship between Karachi and the rest of Pakistan can be regarded as a 
version of the classical dual economy.  The city has a high concentration of the secondary and 
tertiary sectors, draws labour and raw materials from the rest of the country, and acts as the 
conduit for modern economic services. Urban Sindh (taken as a proxy for Karachi) has 
around twice the proportion of workers in service sectors (wholesale and retail trade) and 
manufacturing compared with Pakistan as a whole.  It has three times the proportion of its 
workforce in finance and insurance.  A third of all workers in urban Sindh were in the formal 
sector compared with a sixth in Pakistan, and three-fifths of the workers were employees 
compared with just 37 percent in Pakistan as a whole (Ministry of Finance 2007; World Bank 
2007). With the rest of Sindh, this relationship is even more salient, as the province is mostly 
rural and primary-producing. 
 
As demonstrated above, the smooth running of business and industrial activities in Karachi is 
critical for Pakistan’s economy. The violence and ensuing mayhem in the city often paralyses 
commercial activity, and this causes heavy economic losses to the national economy. For 
example, when violence peaked in 1995, leading to 31 days of strike and 3137 casualties in 
that year, the Karachi Chamber of Commerce estimated the economic cost of strikes in 
Karachi to be $5 billion (HRCP 1995). Similarly, following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in 
2007, the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry estimated losses in Karachi and Sindh 
at about $1.3 billion (Dawn News, January 10, 2008). 
 
In the late 1980s and mid 1990s Karachi’s susceptibility to political violence, organised 
crime, extortion and kidnapping (the latter targeting wealthy business families) resulted in a 
flight of capital and relocation of business to Punjab and industrial sites in NWFP. The 
business elite lobbied for protection and dissatisfied with the performance of the police, set up 
a citizen-police liaison committee (CPLC) with the cooperation of the provincial governor in 
1993 (Interview, Sharfuddin Memon, May 29, 2008). 
  
 
Growth and migration 
Karachi’s demography underwent dramatic changes (Table 1), and migration played a key 
role in these changes.  The city attracted migrants from all over South Asia in search of refuge 
and better livelihoods.  Between 1941 and 1951, the surge in population can be attributed to 
the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and the declaration of Karachi as the capital of the new state. 
Muslim refugees arrived here in large numbers, and a majority of Karachi’s Hindu population 
fled to India. Internal migration, particularly from Punjab and NWFP, accelerated in the 
1950s and 1960s. Internal migration from other cities and rural areas from across the country 
                                                 
8 Authors’ compilations from calculations and statistics available in the Pakistan Economic Survey (Ministry of 
Finance 2006-7), and World Bank (2007). 
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continues to be an important factor in Karachi’s growth, and over time migrants from 
virtually every corner of Pakistan have found a home in the city. 
 
 
Table 1: Population and Growth Rate (1931-2008)  
Source: Population Census Data.  








1931 247,791 2.08% 
1941 359,492 3.79% 
1951 1,006,400 10.84% 
1961 2,044,044 7.34% 
1972 3,606,746 5.24% 
1981 5,437,984 4.62% 
1998 9,856,318 3.02% 
2008 13,246,067 3.00% 
 
 
Sovereign and civil conflict in the region was once again the source of international migration 
to Karachi in the 1970s and 1980s.  Following the secession of East Pakistan in 1971 there 
was a flow of ethnic Bihari refugees who claimed to be ‘stranded Pakistanis’ facing 
discrimination in the newly liberated Bangladesh.  Muslim migrants from Burma sought 
refuge on the grounds of religious repression at the hands of the military government there 
(Gazdar et al. 2005).  The war in Afghanistan was the source of another major wave of 
migration in the 1980s (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon 1995). 
 
These successive waves of migration played their part in changing the ethnic, religious and 
linguistic demographics of Karachi. In 1941, Hindus, Sikhs and Jains made up 53 percent 
while Muslims accounted for 42 percent of the population. In the 1951 census, Muslims were 
98 percent of the population and Hindus were a mere 1.5 percent. In 1947 Sindhi-speakers 
had made up three-fifths of the population. With the influx of multiethnic migrants into the 
city, the Sindhi population in Karachi has become linguistically and culturally marginalised.  
Migrants from India (‘Muhajirs’) were mostly Urdu-speaking, and over the years evolved 
their lingual identity and migrant status into a political identity.  A key feature of Karachi’s 
ethnic demography is that its largest single group (Urdu speakers) is virtually unrepresented 
in the rest of the country, beyond some concentrations in other cities of southern Sindh. 
 
With internal migration (mostly from Punjab and NWFP), the number of Punjabi and Pushto 
speakers also increased in Karachi, making Balochi and Sindhi minority languages in the city 
(Table 2).  These later changes in the ethnic composition of the city are relevant to the 
political developments since the 1980s: the period between the 1981 and 1998 censuses 
indicates a substantial decline in the proportion of Urdu-speakers (from 54 to 49 per cent), 
and corresponding increases in the proportions of Pashtuns, Sindhis and ‘Others’.9 Urdu-
                                                 
9 ‘Others’ include diverse ethnic communities for whom data are not reported separately.  The increase in 
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speakers now constitute an overwhelming majority only in the central district, while the other 
districts are more heterogeneous (see Annex 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Number and Size of Population by Language 
Source: Population Census Data 
Gujarati, which remains an important language in Karachi, was reclassified under ‘others’ in the later rounds of 
the census. 
 
Language 1951 1981 1998 
Urdu 51.45% 54.34% 48.52% 
Sindhi 14.32% 6.29% 7.22% 
Gujarati 11.60% - - 
Punjabi 9.05% 13.64% 13.94% 
Balochi 8.87% 4.39% 4.34% 
Pushto 3.39% 8.71% 11.42% 




Karachi’s position in national politics has been shaped by three sets of relationships: between 
Karachi and the national mainstream; between Karachi and the rest of Sindh province; and 
between Sindh province and the Pakistani federation. 
 
National electoral politics have been dominated by two large parties – the Pakistan Peoples 
Party (PPP) and various factions of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) – that have alternated 
in power since the late 1980s.  The PPP has a strong base in Sindh with the exception of 
Karachi, where it has historically managed to win only a few seats.10  The MQM has been an 
important contender from Karachi and has won a majority of seats in the city in all elections 
that it has contested since 1988.  Since then the party has been in coalition government with 
the PPP (1988 and 2008), and the PML (1990, 1997 and 2002) at the provincial or national 
levels.  The MQM’s partnership ended prematurely in all cases except for the government that 
it led in 2002.  During the periods out of power in the 1990s MQM faced state persecution 
aimed at reducing its militant capability.  This was the period when the party became a key 
ally of the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf.   
 
Following the devolution plan in 2001, there have been two elections for forming the CDGK. 
The MQM boycotted the first elections in 2001, and as a result a coalition of religious parties 
won the mayor’s office. However, in the next election in 2005, the MQM secured a landslide 
victory amid allegations of vote rigging. At that time, the party also controlled the provincial 
government and was represented in the federal government. Following the 2008 national 
elections, the PPP gained power provincially and nationally (see Annex 2); and there were 
high profile attempts between leaders of the MQM and PPP, who had remained bitter rivals 
till then, to improve relations and to find some level of mutual accommodation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Others’ may be due to the migration of Bengali, Burmese and non-Pashtun Afghans, though some informal 
reports suggest that these irregular international migrants were not enumerated in the census. 
10 In the recent 2008 elections, the PPP won over a quarter of the popular vote in Karachi, but only 3 out of the 
20 national assembly seats in the city (Cheema, Gazdar, Naseer and Sayeed. 2008). 
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As a result the MQM joined the provincial government as a junior partner in an uneasy 
coalition with the PPP and the ANP – parties with whom it was involved in bloody conflicts 
in the recent years. There was considerable strain between the CDGK and the province as the 
two levels of government try to assert their authority in overlapping areas of jurisdiction 
(Dawn News, June 13, 30 & July 6, 2008).  The MQM also joined the PPP and ANP in the 
coalition government at the federal level.  Political alliance did not halt inter-party violence.  
Targeted killings of rival political cadres and people belonging to the ‘wrong’ ethnic group 
erupted in December 2008, April 2009, July-August 2009, and then again in January 2010, 
claiming over two hundred lives.  The coalition survived several rounds of inter-party and 
inter-ethnic violence, as well as a key test in the shape of the future of the MQM-dominated 
CDGK whose term came to an end.  A negotiated transitional administration was put in place 
in February 2010 pending fresh elections, which will pose further challenges to the resilience 
of the coalition.  Appeals for maintaining the peace in Karachi played a significant role in 
reining in the more militant voices within each party. 
 
Global dimension 
Hosting key ports, and being the country’s industrial and financial centre, Karachi attracts a 
significant proportion of the foreign investment entering Pakistan. In recent years, the city has 
attracted hefty foreign investments in real estate and infrastructure development from real 
estate developers in the UAE (The News, January 22, 2008). Investments in the stock 
exchange and real estate are propelled by the government’s promises of providing security 
and stabilisation, and also the cordial relations between Pakistani politicians and UAE 
government and investors.  
 
Having a strategic geopolitical relevance, Karachi has also attracted promises of investment 
for urban and infrastructural development from the US (Business Recorder, May 13, 2008). In 
a recent visit to Karachi, Senator Casey visited Port Qasim and remarked that the port facility 
was a preventive tool in the global war on terror, and that it will make ‘our borders safer and 
will also increase the economic efficiency of Pakistani exports’ (US Embassy 2008).  
Karachi’s ports provide key links for the US-led military effort in Afghanistan.  
  
Foreign governments have developed unusual stakes in the city’s politics.  The leader of 
Karachi’s largest party MQM has resided in London since 1992, and has acquired UK 
citizenship.  Many of his trusted lieutenants also reside in London.  The leader of the PPP, 
Benazir Bhutto, and her family split their years of exile between Dubai and London.  It is 
known that the UK and UAE governments played an important role in political negotiations 
between the PPP and the military government in Pakistan.  It is possible that similar efforts at 




Existing explanations for Karachi’s descent into conflict and violence have focused on five 
main themes: (a) ethnicity and ethnic identity; (b) organisations; (c) political conspiracies; (d) 
economic frustration; and (e) external events. There is, of course, a great deal of overlap 
between these various lines of thought.  Here they are examined separately in order to draw 




A great deal of attention has been drawn, understandably, to ethnic identity.  Muhajir ethnic 
identity in particular has proved to be particularly absorbing to researchers and commentators 
alike, who were fascinated by efforts of disparate groups of migrants to reconstitute 
themselves into a distinct ethnic and even ‘national’ community (Baig 2005).  The tendency 
to view Karachi’s conflict and violence in terms of ethnicity is partly a response to the openly 
expressed opinions of the main protagonists.  The MQM did, after all, start its campaign on 
the slogan of representing an embattled and marginalised ‘muhajir’ community, and the 
necessity of armed resistance for the protection of that community. 
 
The simplistic view is that Karachi is an artificial amalgam of diverse ethnic groups, and it is 
but natural that there will be turf battles or worse between them.  A more sophisticated 
rendering recalls that while identity politics offer a natural mode of mobilisation to certain 
classes, group identity can be very fluid in South Asia, and the salience of any particular 
identity often depends on the precise political context.11  The conflict between Muhajirs and 
Pashtuns or Muhajirs and Sindhis represent economic contests over resources, and these 
contests are typical within classes that subsist on public resources (Rashid and Shaheed 1993; 
Sahadevan 1999). 
 
Some ethnic explanations focus on the relative decline in the Muhajirs’ political and 
economic position as they lost out to other groups, having started with a major advantage 
(Waseem 1996).  It has been argued that in the beginning, Urdu-speaking migrants from India 
were more educated and therefore better-placed to access government jobs and private sector 
business opportunities.  Over time Punjabis challenged their domination of top government 
positions, and this process was accelerated when the civil bureaucracy lost out to the military 
in its control over the state.  There were further losses when the revived process of political 
representation in the 1970s reduced the Urdu-speaking community to the status of a political 
and ethnic minority in its adopted province of Sindh.  The relative decline, yet absolute 
advantage, in economic and political fortunes is thought to have given rise to feelings of 
alienation, thus spurring on support for a clear articulation of Muhajir identity.  Some 
commentators have gone so far as to claim that there is historical continuity between the 
Muslim sense of relative decline in India and Muhajir nationalism.12 
 
Organisations 
Another popular approach is to understand conflict and violence in Karachi with reference to 
the internal workings of organisations that operate there.  The MQM, again, is not an 
unsurprising candidate for analysis.  Organisational analysis, however, also applies to state 
organisations, such as different levels of government and public agencies.  The focus on 
criminal gangs and their connections with political parties also properly comes under this 
heading. 
 
Government failures of various types are often held responsible for conflict and violence in 
Karachi.  The most fundamental government failure is the imbalance between elected and 
                                                 
11 Some analysts have argued that emergent middle classes in South Asia that see state employment and 
patronage as a primary source of  economic mobility have found identity politics to be a potent instrument for 
mobilisation (Alavi  & Harriss 1989; Haq 1995). 
12 These conflicts between linguistic groups were, interestingly, only partly about language.  English remained 
the official language of Pakistan, and Urdu was accepted as a language of formal communication in many non-
Urdu speaking regions such as Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan. 
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unelected organs of the state itself.  Frequent disruptions in the democratic process are held 
responsible for the rise of extremist ideologies and organisations (Hasan 2002). Other 
conspicuous government failures are to do with bad governance and rent-seeking behaviour 
on the part of the police and security services, and links between security personnel and 
criminals (Suddle 2003).  The existence of multiple governmental stakeholders in Karachi is 
seen as yet another organisational failure that leads to conflict and violence.  Various levels of 
government – federal, provincial and local – often pursue contradictory goals with respect to 
the city’s resources and development.  Karachi has a large presence of the military, which 
controls vast tracts of land that it uses for commercial purposes. 
 
The internal workings of political parties, particularly the MQM, are thought to be proximate 
determinants of violence.  It has been argued, for example, that the MQM and some other 
parties function as totalitarian entities that are premised on the application of internal and 
external violence (HRCP 2007b; Korejo 2002).  Violence, therefore, is but a natural outcome 
of the organisational model that has evolved in Karachi. Analyses that focus on the interaction 
of organisations with forms of youth culture fall in the same category (Verkaaik 2004; Khan 
2007).  The changing dynamics of the relationship between political parties and student 
groups is another strand in organisational analysis.  The conventional pattern of parties 
forming their student wings is thought to have been reversed in the case of the MQM, which 
itself emerged out of the APMSO.  This is thought to have had implications for the types of 
political activity that were prioritised by the party (Ahmar 1996; Haq 1995; Kennedy 1991). 
 
Political conspiracies 
Popular discourse sees conflict and violence as part of wider conspiracies that are directed to 
achieve political goals.  There is, of course, a great deal of hard and anecdotal evidence that 
connects particular violent events with deliberate but hidden policy actions.  The role of state 
secret agencies in nurturing various ethnic and sectarian organisations, engineering splits, 
providing arms and training, and even instigating acts of political violence have been widely 
discussed in Pakistan.  Investigative reporting has yielded some useful information and 
insight.  The provenance of a large number of organisations – including the Jamaat-e-Islami, 
the MQM and its factions, various other ethnic groups, sectarian groups such as the anti-Shia 
SSP, the Sunni Tehreek, jihadi organisations and criminal gangs – has been traced back to 
powerful secret agencies.  There are also frequent allegations that various organisations have 
worked for foreign intelligence organisations (Shah 2003). 
 
Wider political conspiracies relate to machinations of particular governments to influence the 
ethnic demographic make-up of particular regions in order to gain firmer control over them, 
or fomenting violence in order to sabotage the economic potential of a city in order to put an 
alternate city in a position of advantage.  There is a further idea that violent ethnic and 
sectarian politics are deliberately promoted at times in order to prop up dictators and to 
subvert democratic movements.  Many of these explanations of violence are tenable, given 
that key actors in the state are caught expressing opinions that are consistent with such 
conspiracies.  An important consequence of the political conspiracy theories of all hues is that 
they erase the distinction between state and non-state violence. 
 
Economic frustration 
Economic frustration, particularly youth unemployment, is often used as a way of 
understanding the rise in violent crime.  Party-political rhetoric has sometimes played upon 
feelings of economic frustration in order to solidify support for identity-based mobilisation.  
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The rising tide of consumerism coupled with low rates of job growth is thought to have 
fuelled street crime and other violent misdemeanours.  Explanations concerned with 
demographic and inter-generational dynamics also focus on economic frustration as a 
determinant of violence. 
 
Some of the arguments for ethnic solidarity are based on rivalry between groups for access to 
limited public sector jobs or educational opportunities.13  Alavi’s salariat framework provides 
a good entry point into this discussion.  It has also been argued that violent organisations have 
offered young men from poor families a sense of empowerment over older generations, as 
well as the more affluent classes (Alavi and Harriss 1989). 
 
External factors 
Finally, factors external to the city are thought to have played an important role in pushing 
Karachi towards conflict and violence.  The growth of the city was itself a consequence of 
larger political events – notably the partition of India and related demographic changes.  
Other regional conflicts also had a major impact.  The civil war in East Pakistan and the 
liberation of Bangladesh brought new refugees, and led to further anxieties concerning ethnic 
demographic balances. 
 
The war in Afghanistan affected Pakistan in general and Karachi too in specific ways. There 
was an influx of Afghan refugees that added a new dimension to the trajectory of migration in 
the city.  The war in Afghanistan was also associated with the breakdown of many established 
systems of governance.  The Pakistan government became an active participant in the war 
while maintaining a public posture of non-interference.  This required the development of a 
parallel institutional infrastructure and the loosening of formal controls over illicit trade and 
unregulated currency movements. 
 
The proliferation of unregulated weapons markets is thought to have led to a rapid increase in 
the availability of sophisticated armaments to non-state actors.  The conduct of the war in 
Afghanistan had already resulted in a blurring of the boundaries between state and non-state 
actors in the first instance.  Small arms – including automatic assault rifles, handguns and 
rocket launchers – were readily available on the black market and found their way into the 
hands of various student groups and political parties. 
 
 
Openness and informality 
The five themes outlined above encompass much of the existing scholarly, political and 
policy-oriented discussion on conflict and violence in Karachi.  Taken together these five 
themes provide a convincing account of the qualitative and quantitative changes in the city 
over the decades, particularly since the mid-1980s.  There are, of course, gaps and limitations, 
but none that are insurmountable to research.  For example, the ethnic identity approach can 
be developed further to include issues of economic class and their interaction with ethnicity.  
The acknowledged fluidity of identity preferences can also be operationalised further to 
understand the dynamics of ethnic identity construction over other forms.  There is, clearly, 
scope for empirical work on the relationship between economic conditions and criminal and 
political violence.  Likewise, archival and interview-based research can reveal yet more 
insights into ‘political conspiracies’ affecting various stakeholders. 
                                                 
13 The tension between Muhajirs and Sindhis is often dated back to the introduction of separate urban and rural 
quotas for government jobs and higher education places (Kennedy 1984).  
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While accepting the need to deepen research in all of these areas, this paper proposes a 
complementary institutional approach that focuses on two outstanding and incontrovertible 
aspects of Karachi’s urbanity: migration and informality.   It draws on an impressive body of 
work done by heterodox urban planners and analysts that has placed informal public 
provisioning at the core of Karachi’s growth experience.14  This perspective on Karachi can 
be viewed, of course, in the broader context of scholarly work on the informal urban sector in 
developing countries (De Soto 2000).  The point of departure of the thesis pursued here is the 
inductive premise that an understanding of Karachi’s experience with conflict and violence 
should be informed by the specific (and much analysed) trajectory of urbanisation. 
 
It is proposed that the growth of political violence in Karachi was an outcome of the very 
processes that made Karachi an open city in the first instance.  The high rate of migration 
coincided with an erosion of the formal sector’s capacity for supplying basic infrastructure or 
regulating the use of existing infrastructure.  This resulted in bringing forth an informal 
response, which was in turn aided and abetted by state organisations and personnel (Linden 
1991).  It is estimated, for example, that 50 percent of the city’s population resides in 
localities that were settled informally (Hasan and Mohib n.d.) – illegally or irregularly 
acquired, or with gross violations of existing regulations concerning land use.  About 47 
percent of the city’s water needs were supplied using water tankers, a majority of which drew 
water from hydrants managed by the water utility (Rahman 2008).  Public transport systems 
were dominated by private contractors who informally managed bus routes, ran unregistered 
bus stands, and charged and enforced user fees from individual bus operators.  In all these 
activities state organisations and their personnel were active participants and colluders, and 
charged systematic bribes (Ismail 2002).  The heterodox view in urban planning is that the 
informal sector was an effective provider of public goods and services particularly to the 
poor. 
 
The informalisation of public provisioning, however, was premised on two institutional 
deviations: first, the large-scale legitimisation of private non-state arrangements for contract 
enforcement; and second, the strengthening of existing or nascent social networks based on 
bonds of family, ethnicity, and religious and sectarian identity.  For the large segments of the 
economy that operated informally, the formal policing, legal and judicial systems were 
unlikely to help in contract enforcement and dispute arbitration.  These two institutional 
deviations – non-state enforcement and salience of social networks based on prior notions of 
solidarity − which were necessary for the expansion of the informal sector, also became 
conspicuous features of the city’s politics.   
 
 
Land and housing 
This section presents brief case studies of six localities across Karachi, which were 
established at different stages in the city’s development.  The case studies are based on 
qualitative data collected by the authors in these localities over the last five years, consisting 
mostly of interviews with local residents, including political representatives and community 
leaders, and direct observations.  The six localities were all considered to be relatively low 
income areas and had undergone various processes of regularisation over time.  One 
                                                 
14 Arif Hasan, Tasneem Siddiqi and Perween Rahman are leading proponents of this viewpoint, which was 
embraced by Akhtar Hameed Khan – a pioneering teacher-activist involved in urban community development 
(Hasan 2002). 
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consideration in selecting them was to ensure that taken together they provided a reasonable 
representation of the city’s ethnic heterogeneity. 
 
The case studies focus on the issue of land and housing.  As noted above, the reliance on, and 
proliferation of, informal provisioning of public goods and services has been a conspicuous 
feature of Karachi’s growth.  Nearly all the studies are stories of displacement, migration, 
encroachment and stage-wise regularisation.  Questions about dispute resolution, contract 
enforcement and collective action were also addressed, and some of the narratives from these 
localities are summarised here.  Some details of the settlements, socio-economic data from 
secondary sources and an inventory of public services are provided in Annex 3. 
 
Natha Khan Goth 
The oldest inhabitants of the Natha Khan Goth are a cluster of ethnic Sindhi families of the 
Panhwar tribe.  The Panhwars are thought to be among the oldest inhabitants inland of 
Karachi, and their presence here was recorded in the early colonial documents of the mid-
nineteenth century.  The original Natha Khan Goth, or village, was named after their ancestor 
who held over a hundred acres of land in an area that is currently part of a military 
cantonment.  Natha Khan was a farmer and cattle herder who became rich through supplying 
fresh vegetables and dairy to the fast growing city of Karachi in the early part of the twentieth 
century.  In 1907, the British colonial government required more land to expand its military 
facilities in Karachi.  The Natha Khan village was evicted and in compensation the family 
was allotted around 17 acres of undeveloped land further away from the city centre.  This is 
the location of present-day Natha Khan Goth. 
 
After independence there was a steady wave of migration from the northern regions of 
Pakistan, and ethnic Pashtun migrants from various districts of the NWFP began to arrive in 
Natha Khan.  There was plenty of land then, and the Sindhi landowners began to charge rents 
from the Pashtun migrants for putting up make-shift huts on their land.  A fight broke out 
over the payment of rents, which developed into a feud between the Sindhis and the Pashtuns, 
lasting several years and causing six deaths.  Sindhis claimed that the Pashtuns were 
emboldened by their rising numbers and the tacit support they received from fellow Pashtun 
state personnel.  The Pashtun hold that the land actually did not belong to the Sindhis in any 
case, and that they used to demand rent in the early years due to their sheer numerical and 
political strength.  There is agreement, however, that before the 1960s the Pashtuns were few 
in number and paid rent to Natha Khan, whereas from the 1960s they began to constitute an 
overwhelming majority and stopped paying rent. 
 
There were other important stakeholders too, including state organisations such as the 
military, the railways and the civil aviation authority.  The claim made by Natha Khan’s 
descendents that they were the original owners of the land at the present site of the village or 
at its original location closer to the city centre, were not accepted by the state authorities − in 
this case the cantonment board that claimed to have acquired the land from the provincial 
government for defence purposes.  Natha Khan was not the owner but had been allowed use 
of the land for farming and raising dairy cattle.  It is quite possible, of course, that Natha 
Khan’s family was the original but unregistered owners of the land even before the 
cantonment board acquired it from the provincial government. In any case, the fact that 
Ghancha Gul − who emerged as a key protagonist and leader on the Pashtun side − was an 
employee of the cantonment board, fuelled Sindhi suspicions that the cantonment board and 
other state authorities had become partial to the Pashtuns.  The Sindhis linked this suspicion 
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with their reading of national politics that the 1960s military government was led by Pashtun 
officers. 
 
In the 1980s there was an opening for people living in irregular settlements to get their 
settlements officially notified and to obtain lease documents from the government.  The 
authorities accepted the claims of the Pashtun neighbourhoods for regularisation.  The few 
Sindhi families did not apply for regularisation because they argued that they already held the 
title not only to their own part of Natha Khan Goth, but also to the land on which the Pashtun 
neighbourhoods had been settled. 
 
Informal community organisations were active in the Pashtun neighbourhoods.  These were 
based on the district of origin of the various migrants who settled in distinct quarters within 
Natha Khan, named after the place of origin – such as Swabi, Mardan and Kohat – in the 
NWFP.  One of the main functions of the community organisations was that they acted as 
funeral insurance clubs.  Members contributed a small annual fee, and were ensured that in 
case of death the organisation would make arrangements for transporting the body for burial 
to the district of origin. 
 
Lines Area 
The (British Indian) military controlled large tracts of land in the city centre, and in part of 
this barracks and houses had been constructed for troops and officers based in Karachi during 
the Second World War.  At the time of independence and partition displaced people flooded 
into Karachi from western and northern provinces of India − particularly Uttar Pradesh (then 
United Provinces), Bihar, Madhya Pradesh (then Central Provinces), Rajasthan (then 
Rajputana) and Gujarat (then Bombay).  These mostly Urdu-speaking migrants and their 
descendants are also known as Muhajir (refugee).  The barracks and houses near the city 
centre were named after campaigns and officers of the British Indian army, and came to be 
known collective as the Lines Area.  The Lines Area consists of the Jacob, Jutland, Tunisia 
and Abyssinia Lines, as well as a number of adjoining settlements that started life as 
encroachments on military land. 
 
When Karachi started receiving large numbers of displaced people the government decided to 
allow refugee camps to spring up on unused public and private land in and around the city. 
The city was also the capital of the newly formed state, and a majority of the central 
government employees were Muslim officers and staff who had ‘opted’ for Pakistan at the 
time of the partition.  There was a serious housing crisis for government employees of all 
ranks arriving from India, and the unused military housing of the Lines Area were handed 
over to them as a temporary measure.  Public-owned open space around the Lines Area 
became a vast refugee camp; and after a few years the refugees were still there, having 
converted their tents into more durable dwellings, but with minimal public infrastructure. 
 
Some ten years after independence and the arrival of the first refugees the central government, 
which was still in charge of Karachi by virtue of being the national capital, began an eviction 
drive in the city centre.  Around the Lines Area the main focus of the eviction drive was to 
clear the main thoroughfares and to create a large public park to house the mausoleum of the 
state’s founding father who had died in 1948.  Work on the mausoleum and the evictions 
started in earnest in 1958 with the coming to power of the military regime of Ayub Khan.  It 
was felt by some that the civilian governments of the 1950s had been reluctant to forcibly 
evict the refugees, for political reasons:  leading Muslim politicians who had migrated to 
Pakistan from India did not have support bases in the country, and localities such as the Lines 
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Area and surrounding refugee camps offered the possibility of developing territorial 
constituencies.  The military government had no such constraints and many refugees from the 
city centre were relocated to new localities several kilometres in the suburbs.  The Lines Area, 
as it is known today, consists of two types of quarters: the former military quarters under the 
possession of post-independence government employees;, and the refugee camps, turned into 
irregular settlements. Although the latter were clearly the more vulnerable to the threat of 
eviction (the drives for which they survived in the 1950s and the 1960s), but the former also 
carried uncertain rights of tenure. 
 
The election of a civilian government in the 1970s brought greater security to the Lines Area.  
The new populist government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s PPP announced that it was going to 
regularise irregular settlements.  This won the party some support in the area, and residents of 
one of the irregular settlements within the Lines Area renamed their locality Shahnawaz 
Bhutto Colony after the father of the prime minister.  There was also an understanding that 
those government employees who had been housed in the former military houses would retain 
their homes even if they left government service or retired.  In the event there was no 
formalisation of property rights, even though rights of possession became secure and were 
transacted.  Government departments began to supply services such as electricity, water and 
sanitation even to the irregular settlements in the Lines Area. 
 
One of the local leaders who emerged in the late 1970s was Zahoor Bhopali, who campaigned 
against evictions and for infrastructural development.  He was from a better-off part of the 
Lines Area and was known as an educated and literary man.  Bhopali began his political 
career as an activist of a moderate Islamic party.  After the military coup against Bhutto’s 
government Bhopali was befriended by the army chief Zia-ul-Haq.  He used his connection 
with Zia to gain further concessions for the Lines Area.  Bhopali based his local mobilisation 
on ethnic grounds: he broke with the Islamic party and set up a local group that paid explicit 
attention to the conditions of the Muhajirs.  He was assassinated by unknown persons in 1980. 
 
Soon after, the MQM began to mobilise young Muhajirs also on ethnic grounds.  The 
founding leader of the MQM, Altaf Hussain, was a former resident of the Lines Area, and he 
was able to gain influence there quickly.  While Bhopali had been seen as an educated and 
cultured notable, the MQM political model was based on youth mobilisation, irreverence and 
armed force.  In the late 1980s, MQM cadres were involved in conflicts with non-Muhajir 
residents of the Lines Area, and in one incident several houses belonging to ethnic Pashtuns 
were set alight.  They and many other non-Muhajirs, including ethnic Punjabis and Sindhis, 
were forced to leave the neighbourhood.  In the 1990s, the Lines Area was a major site of 
conflict between rival MQM factions, and MQM factions and the police.  Some well-known 




Akhtar Colony was formed in the 1960s as a result of eviction.  Its residents originally 
occupied a stretch of land close to a railway line, and had to move when the military 
authorities acquired that area to construct a hospital.  Most of the residents were migrants 
from Punjab who were employed in menial jobs in various government departments.  Job 
opportunities had opened up when the provinces of West Pakistan were merged into one unit 
in 1955, making residents of Punjab and NWFP eligible for provincial government 
employment in Karachi.  Many were civilian employees of the military.  When they were 
evicted from their original place of settlement they moved a little further away beyond the 
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perimeter of a planned upper-class housing society for military officers.  The area was not 
designated for formal development because it was close to a seasonal river and was low-lying 
and flood prone. 
 
The retired army commander for Karachi, General Akhtar Pagganwala, helped these migrants 
to acquire secure tenurial rights to their plots as well as basic physical infrastructure.  He was 
one among several senior military and civil officers who went out of their way to establish 
migrants’ settlements in or around government or cantonment land, and the colony named 
after him.  Akhtar Colony developed into a middle class locality, and property prices in some 
of its segments are comparable with the rates prevailing in the neighbouring upper-class 
military officers’ housing society.  The colony remains predominantly ethnic Punjabi. 
 
Kausar Niazi Colony 
Kausar Niazi Colony is in the north-central part of the city, in an area that was developed for 
formal housing schemes in the mid-1970s.  Nawaz Khan was an ethnic Pashtun migrant 
worker from NWFP who came to Karachi in the 1960s.  Like many other ethnic Pashtuns he 
started work as a travelling salesmen, selling foreign-manufactured smuggled cloth fabric. As 
his business developed he moved to an undeveloped area close to a seasonal river.  He first 
asked some families of Afghan nomads to set up camp in the area.  He knew them through his 
trade – as they too brought smuggled cloth to sell in Karachi.  Quite soon some eighty Afghan 
families arrived with their tents and started living here. Nawaz also approached other 
labourers to come and set up their makeshift huts, and by 1970 there were some two hundred 
families living in the area. 
 
In the meanwhile the PPP had emerged as a new political party and Nawaz − who had 
become visible as a community leader − was invited to join it and become its local 
representative.  The area was undeveloped and there was hardly any population at the time.  
In a few years Nawaz had developed links with a number of PPP leaders, including Kausar 
Niazi, a minister in the cabinet of Zulfikar Bhutto.  According to Nawaz, Niazi encouraged 
him to get more people to move to the area and to develop a political base for future elections.  
Nawaz named the settlement after Kausar Niazi. 
 
More migrants from NWFP, Punjab and other parts of the country started to arrive and settle 
in Kausar Niazi Colony.  Nawaz was regarded as the de facto owner of the land, and he 
marked out individual plots of various sizes and sold them to the migrants.  His connections 
with Kausar Niazi meant that the police and the city authorities were inhibited from 
demolishing the houses or evicting the settlement.  As formal sector housing developed in the 
area, several stakeholders emerged claiming ownership of the land: the Karachi Development 
Authority (KDA) argued that it owned the land; and two private sector developers claimed 
that they had been allotted the land to develop formal sector housing.  Nawaz was able to 
mobilise the residents to effectively resist attempts at demolition and eviction.  There were 
clashes with the police in which several people were injured.  A new law for regularising 
irregular settlements was enacted in 1985, and this allowed Nawaz and other residents to get 
their settlement registered and regularised. 
 
Noor-us-Sabeeh Mohalla 
Noor-us-Sabeeh Mohalla is a quarter of a large informal settlement called Machhar Colony 
(mosquito colony) in the south of the city, close to the harbour.  All of Machhar Colony, 
including Noor-us-Sabeeh Mohalla, is on land reclaimed from swamps and mangroves that 
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used to get inundated by tidal flows.  Officially the area comes under the jurisdiction of the 
Karachi Port Trust (KPT), which is a government-run authority for managing the Karachi 
port.  Noor-us-Sabeeh Mohalla gets its name from a local ethnic Bengali community leader 
who first moved into this quarter of Machhar Colony. 
 
Machhar Colony started to be colonised in the 1980s as migrant workers arrived from various 
places – including ethnic Pashtuns from the NWFP and ethnic Bengalis from Bangladesh and 
from other parts of the city.  The colony started developing on low-lying swamp land close to 
the old city quarters of Lyari, which is dominated by the ethnic Baloch and Kachhi 
communities.  The Lyari Baloch dominated port labour and transport, and the Kachhis were 
traditionally a seafaring community.  The new migrants were also engaged in these sectors. 
 
Noor-us-Sabeeh Mohalla was an extension of Machhar Colony into its farthest corner.  Ethnic 
Pashtun land suppliers had first marked out plots of land with stone markings in the mid-
1990s.  They carried out some reclamation work later by bringing lorry-loads of earth fill to 
stem the tidal flow.  The plots had already exchanged hands several times by the time the area 
was ready to be used.  The sale would be recorded on stamped paper as a civil contract 
between the Pashtun land supplier and the buyer.  It was not possible to conduct a proper land 
transaction, of course, because the land supplier himself did not possess title.  Noor-us-
Sabeeh arrived here along with a number of other ethnic Bengali families from a more settled 
part of Machhar Colony in 2001.  They bought the plots and continued with the reclamation 
work.  Within a few years much of the area had been bought and settled, with the buyers 
constructing concrete structures. 
 
KPT officials frequented the area and demanded bribes from the local residents as fees from 
protection against demolition and eviction.  They also enforced informal regulation regarding 
housing size and structures.  If, for example, a person raised an extra storey, the KPT officials 
had to be paid an additional fee.  Police officers also came to the area to demand bribes 
against the threat of eviction and arrest.  Since most of the ethnic Bengalis were irregular 
migrants from Bangladesh, they felt vulnerable to violation of immigration laws.  Most of the 
houses in Noor-us-Sabeeh had electricity, and many of them had their own electric meters.  In 
the records of the electricity company these meters were supposed to be located elsewhere, in 
a regularised part of the settlement.  Electricity company officials took bribes from the local 
residents in order to fudge the record.  There was no regular piped system of water supply in 
the quarter, though there was in other parts of Machhar Colony.  Noor-us-Sabeeh residents 
maintained their own storage tanks and bought water from water sellers. 
 
In the initial period of the settlement the Pashtun land supplier had mediated relations with the 
police and KPT officials.  As the settlement became more durable – through the arrival of 
more residents, the construction of concrete buildings and the acquisition of electricity supply 
– the role of the Pashtun land supplier diminished.  The residents dealt with the KPT and 
police officials themselves, or through Noor-us-Sabeeh.  The Bengalis had brought with them 
a model of community known as the ‘Shamas’, which consisted of a group of families that 
regarded themselves as a common entity with one leader.  Noor-us-Sabeeh headed the 
Shamas and was looked upon to arbitrate internal disputes.  This model, though different from 
the kinship and tribe-based collective action common among other ethnic groups in Karachi, 
served the same functions. 
 
The ethnic Bengalis had developed close connections with the ethnic Baloch – many of whom 
were captains or owners of fishing vessels on which the Bengalis worked – and had migrated 
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as far as Balochistan and Iran through Baloch social networks.  The Bengalis received some 
measure of protection through their connection with the Baloch, who had greater access to 
political parties and leaders.  Since around 2003 some Bengali youth had started working with 
the MQM.  They had been supplied with handguns, and were sometimes called on to support 
party activities in other parts of the city. 
 
Ghazi Goth 
There is a stretch of high rocky ground in the north-east of the city that is surrounded by land 
designated by the city authorities for educational and recreational purposes.  Some residents 
claim that the rocks are an ancient site of pilgrimage for local Hindus.  In the mid-1990s the 
area now known as Ghazi Goth or Ghazi village had only a dozen or so households living in 
makeshift huts, and without any public utilities.  They consisted of some Afghan nomadic 
families and a handful of Bagris households from rural Sindh.  The Bagris are a marginalised 
caste in the Hindu hierarchy, and are regarded as untouchable by high caste Hindus and 
Muslims alike.  The Afghans and the Bagris were both involved in marginalised economic 
activities such as rag picking, begging and selling flowers at traffic junctions. 
 
Ghazi Abdullah is a cleric who heads his own small madrassa (religious school), which he 
started building on state land in this area in the late 1990s.  He is an ethnic Punjabi but lived 
in rural Sindh before moving to Karachi.  He is known to have connections in the police and 
the administration.  As Ghazi was developing his madrassa he was introduced to Babra – a 
Hijra through a mutual Sindhi acquaintance.15  Ghazi asked Babra to arrange to bring more 
people to live on the land surrounding his Madrassa.  He was aware that Babra had many 
connections among the poor and marginalised groups, and would be able to bring them to 
Ghazi Goth.  At the time there were also evictions from a number of makeshift settlements 
that were mostly made up of poor migrants from southern Punjab and NWFP.  Ghazi 
contacted the evicted families and asked them to settle in ‘his’ village.  Currently Ghazi Goth 
consists of over three hundred households, including Bagris, ethnic Seraikis from southern 
Punjab, Afghans and Hijras.  The common feature among all of them is that they are from 
socially marginalised groups and engaged in low-status economic activities. 
 
The land on which Ghazi Goth is settled belongs to the city authorities. Although there is no 
immediate private claimant – perhaps because the land is rocky and hard to develop for 
commercial purposes – the authorities regularly raid and demolish the huts, and as a result 
most of the houses are still makeshift.  There have been several occasions when the settlement 
was razed and the residents detained, though most of them returned and rebuilt their huts.  
There has never been any attempt at demolishing the Ghazi’s madrassa. There are no public 
utilities, although some Muslim families are allowed to take electricity from the madrassa, 
which does have a connection.  There is a water mains that passes close by the settlement and 
residents have tapped into it.  There are no drains and therefore no proper toilets.  The 
residents have not paid anything to live here, and there has been no transaction to legally 
establish possession.  The only formal recognition of the existence of the settlement is that 
many residents have given Ghazi Goth as their residential address for their national identity 
cards, and this address has been accepted by the citizenship-registration system. 
 
                                                 
15 The Hijra or Khusra are a marginalised but socially accepted community of transvestite and transsexual men.  
Some homosexual and bisexual men also associate themselves with this community.  The Hijras have well-
defined community structures, and traditionally receive alms on special life cycle events such as weddings and 
births.  Many of them work as beggars and some are engaged in sex work. 
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Non-state violence and social networks 
Karachi’s phenomenal demographic growth was premised on large-scale migration from 
neighbouring states and other districts and provinces within Pakistan.  The proliferation of 
irregular settlements, moreover, was a necessary condition for this migration.  The city could 
not grow without an influx of labour.  Nearly all formal sector housing developments, 
however, were designed for the upper and middle classes.  In fact, given the excess demand 
for housing, any formal development was bound to end up as a middle or upper class locality.  
After all, secure title and property rights in land exist only in land that has been brought under 
specific formal sector housing schemes. 
 
The rest of the land is subject to great variation and uncertainty in title and property rights. 
There is a multiplicity of claimants, starting from ‘indigenous’ communities (such as the 
Panhwar Sindhis of Natha Khan), the provincial government, city authorities, cantonment and 
military authorities, para-statal organisations (such as the port authority in Noor-us-Sabeeh), 
as well as various regular and irregular settlers. 
 
For a poor migrant the informal sector would always be the natural destination, given that he 
or she would always be willing to trade in tenurial security for a price discount.  The absence 
of clear title and property rights has not altogether prevented transactions from taking place.  
Informal institutions – the most important one being the commodification of possession – 
have led to a thriving market in low-cost housing.  The cases of Kausar Niazi Colony and 
Noor-us-Sabeeh are obvious ones.  The stage-wise development of residential housing in 
these two localities shows that transactors do not wait for regularisation before they start 
buying, selling and renting. 
 
Each successive transaction can add value in the process by incrementally strengthening the 
security of the right to possession.  The proliferation of informal transactions does not mean 
that these transactions are secure, only that a risk discount is incorporated into the price.  
There are, of course, cases like Ghazi Goth where the political weakness of the resident 
communities ensures that the settlements never successfully climb the ladder of 
regularisation.  Ghazi Goth residents are the most marginalised segments of Pakistani society, 
due to caste, religion and profession.  In fact, it is quite likely that they will have to leave to 
make room for slightly better-off people if the patron of Ghazi Goth manages to secure his 
own position.  His reason for inviting beggars to come and settle on the land were not very 
different for the reasons that Afghan nomads have been used by Pakistani Pashtun patrons, as 
in Kausar Niazi Colony: these are precisely the groups who will put up with the extremely 
insecure tenure that the early stages of land development have to offer. 
 
The informal sector does not operate in isolation from formal state agencies and service 
providers.  The regularisation of land title or the right to possession is only one conspicuous 
interface between the formal and the informal.  The entire process of informal housing 
development is premised on frequent transactions between private parties and state personnel.  
Sometimes the intervention is in the form of patronage – as in the cases of Akhtar Colony and 
possibly Natha Khan – where state officials acted as protectors of irregular settlements.  In 
other cases the relationship is electoral – as in the Lines Area and Kausar Niazi Colony in the 
1970s.  In many instances, particularly the more recent ones, the interaction appears to be a 
purely commercial one.  This is vividly illustrated in Noor-us-Sabeeh (Machhar Colony) 
where officials of the port authority allow residents to remain on land owned by the authority 
on the payment of bribes.  In fact, numerous smaller transactions that contribute to the 
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incremental regularisation of a settlement involve bribes to local government officials, police 
and agents of public utilities such as electricity, gas and water supply. 
 
Violence and the threat of violence were recurrent methods for enabling transactions and the 
process of settlement and regularisation.  Forced eviction on the part of the state authorities 
was a common feature in nearly all migration stories, at least in the beginning.  The ability to 
inflict or withstand violence was an important characteristic of individuals and groups that 
first occupied state-owned land for development.  Collective action, too, was a critically 
important feature in negotiating and re-negotiating property rights in an environment of 
institutional fluidity.  Prior kinship and ethnic networks were conspicuous in both the story of 
migration, as well as the story of settlement and regularisation.  The presence of ethnic 
Pashtun land suppliers was particularly conspicuous.  Their comparative advantage lay in 
their ability to credibly threaten the use of force,16 and to quickly mobilise large numbers of 
men on the grounds of kinship and ethnic solidarity.  Punjabi migrants, on the other hand, 
appeared to have relied more effectively on their social connections with state personnel, 
particularly in the military. 
 
The case of the Lines Area shows that the formal recognition of tenurial security were not 
sufficient by themselves for ensuring effective security.  Although a populist government had 
announced in 1975 that the residents would be awarded property rights, it was still many 
years later that public infrastructure followed.  In the event formal individual titles were not 
granted even three decades and several policies later, even though it became increasingly 
difficult to evict the occupants.  The Lines Area also provides an insight into the change in the 
nature of negotiation in the 1980s following the demise of Bhopali – who believed in 
petitioning the authorities – and the arrival of the MQM, which took direct armed action to 
confront the authorities as well as other ethnic groups. 
 
The rise of the MQM and other violent ethnic-based groups in the 1980s happened in a 
context where formal institutions of the state offered little contractual security to poor 
communities in the most fundamental sector: housing.  There was a history of evictions, but 
also successful mobilisation for resisting eviction, changing or bending land-use regulations 
and accessing public infrastructure.  State personnel had every incentive to persist with 
irregularity as it became a major source of private income for the regulators.  It was also clear 
that group-based mobilisations of various forms – mostly around kinship and ethnicity – 
yielded positive outcomes.  Ethnic solidarity had proved to pay high dividends – either 
through patronage of powerful individuals and organisations within the state, or through 
numerical mobilisation. 
 
As its cadres returned from the campuses to their low to middle-income communities, the 
MQM had little difficulty persuading fellow Muhajirs (and not only the youth) that they were 
surrounded by ethnic groups that enjoyed a high sense of kinship-based solidarity and 
articulation.  These other groups – particularly the ethnic Pashtuns – were also known for 
their ability to inflict and withstand violence.  The Muhajirs, therefore, needed to counter the 
kinship-based solidarity internal to other ethnic groups through the formation of a dedicated 
and ideologically motivated organisation.  Moreover, this organisation needed to be armed. 
 
In fact, the MQM youth began to mimic many of the functions of ethnic communities they 
despised as being uncultured and unschooled.  The focus shifted away from political issues to 
                                                 
16 This was possible partly due to reputation effects, and partly because wanted men could easily escape to their 
home districts after committing crimes. 
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contract enforcement, dispute arbitration and policing within the Muhajir communities – and 
the collection of ‘donations’ in order to finance the organisations’ activities.  This form of 
self-governance had been common among many other ethnic groups with traditional forms of 
solidarity and leadership.  Internal group sovereignty from state institutions was seen as a 
positive attribute at a time when state functionaries were seen as parasitic rent-seekers.  The 
MQM attempted to transform the ‘Muhajir community’ − whose numerous constituents had 
shed many of their parochial identities and traditional hierarchies at the moment of 
displacement in favour of a citizen-based identity − into the largest and most powerful 
solidarity network in Karachi. 
 
Informality in land ownership, but not just in land, offers a vast arena for the continuous 
negotiation and renegotiation of economic rents.  This can be seen clearly if we compare the 
descriptions provided above with an alternate hypothetical scenario of land development.  In 
fact, the development of upper class housing schemes, such as the Defence Housing 
Authority, can serve as an alternate model (Siddiqa 2007).  The DHA acquired land from the 
provincial government – which is the residual claimant to all land – for the purpose of 
allotting residential and commercial plots to retired military officers as a reward for service.  
It was assumed that the land belonged to the provincial government in the first instance, and 
rival claims of ownership on the part of the ‘indigenous’ residents were brushed aside.  The 
DHA being under the direct control of the local army commander, was able to impose a very 
low nominal transfer price with the provincial government. 
 
The DHA developed the land and allotted it to military officers at prices that only covered the 
cost of development.  Military officers promptly sold the plots on the market, earning profits 
in the range of double or triple the initial investment. DHA land is thought to be securely 
held, with a high level of trust in the legal title and strong checks against fraud and rival 
claims.  The margin earned by the military officers represents an economic rent on the use-
value of the land, but also includes a premium on the security of the title.  The economic rent 
incorporates the military authorities’ ability to effect and enforce an initial transaction with 
the provincial government, and to enforce subsequent contracts.  It also incorporates the 
expectation that the military authorities will not themselves act in a predatory manner with 
respect to owners in the DHA.  This latter expectation is partly based on a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, since most buyers and residents in DHA are themselves wealthy and powerfully-
connected individuals.  The economic rent, in any case, is virtually all concentrated in the first 
transaction, whose beneficiary is the individual military officer. 
 
By contrast, the cases of low to middle income settlements in Karachi have shown that there 
is a steady process of economic rent creation and appropriation, as land changes possession 
and use.  The process is punctuated by political mobilisation, collective action and violent 
conflict.  There is no binary division, therefore, between the formal and informal sectors.  
Rather, there is a continuous process of formalisation – not always linear – in which 
economic rents are created and appropriated (sometimes destroyed) through political means.  
The DHA case is also, of course, one of political appropriation of rents, but the political 
mobilisation and the rent appropriation are both concentrated at one point.  In Kausar Niazi 
colony, by contrast, there were multiple stakeholders that sequentially participated in, and 




Negotiation and renegotiation of rents 
The institutional approach to understanding conflict and violence in Karachi suggests a strong 
underlying willingness and ability on the part of agents to conduct economic transactions that 
might be illegal but are considered to be socially legitimate.  It might be argued, in the spirit 
of de Soto (2000), that the formalisation of private property rights in land (and the reduction 
of unnecessary and rent-creating regulation), will undermine the legitimacy of non-state 
violence and informal social networks.  Our case studies from Karachi suggest, however, that 
the assignment of property rights in land will itself generate conflict and violence, because of 
the high degree of contestation over claims.  Moreover, the process of regularisation creates 
new economic rents that are contested, negotiated and renegotiated. 
 
Karachi’s disarticulation from the national political mainstream was driven only in part by the 
ideology and organisational characteristics of the MQM.  In reality, political life in the city 
was already dominated by local contests over economic rents.  As the city grew without 
corresponding increases in investments in infrastructure and public services, the informal 
sector grew disproportionately.  The city was open for migrants and displaced people – all 
they had to figure out was which rung of the socio-economic ladder was theirs to start with. 
 
There was nothing inevitable about Muhajir ethnic mobilisation, or the nature of the 
organisation that emerged as the self-proclaimed protector of the city’s largest ‘ethnic’ group.  
But the notion of a citizenship-based urban community with claims on the state, pursued 
through formal administrative, political and legal routes was already long in disrepair by the 
1980s. Migrants from India had once been the most prominent candidates for non-parochial 
modern citizenship in Pakistan – due to their urbanity, loosening of traditional hierarchies and 
relatively high reliance on formal sector economic opportunities.  It was ironic that they gave 
birth to an organisation that took non-state violence and ethnic solidarity to hitherto unknown 
levels in Karachi. 
 
It was not just about the MQM.  Other groups and factions, many of them much smaller than 
the MQM, followed similar methods and technologies.  The breakaway MQM-Haqiqi faction, 
which emerged under official patronage during periods of state suppression of the mainstream 
MQM, was little different in attempting to assume the role of local enforcement.  Various 
religious groups also operated in a similar manner, often with state support.  In many of the 
tougher neighbourhoods there was little difference between criminal gangs and the youth 
cadre of political and religious factions. 
 
The escalation in violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s was triggered by party-political 
conflict with ethnic overtones.  There was also a trajectory, however, of organisations 
(predominantly MQM factions at that time) expanding their bases and projecting power 
within low- and middle-income localities.  In other words, as student activists-turned political 
cadres became successful in challenging existing non-state enforcers, particularly those from 
other ethnic groups, they were encouraged to expand the scope of their actions and violence.  
Rents had been renegotiated and for the players involved there were few apparent hurdles to 
further expansion. 
 
The checks, when they did come, originated not from rival ethnic parties or non-state actors 
that had lost rank to the MQM, but the state itself.  The successive state campaigns to curb the 
activities of the MQM in the 1990s were initiated with the explicit purpose of limiting the 
challenge the organisation was perceived to have posed to the coercive superiority of the state 
apparatus.  The coalition of forces that acted against the MQM in the 1990s included 
 29
important segments of the state-security apparatus, national and provincial political parties, 
and the industrial and business elite. These three groups had quite disparate motives, but were 
all clear that the MQM’s brand of politics had finally reached its natural limits.  The city’s 
business elite, which had once voluntarily financed the MQM’s rise from low- and middle-
income communities into provincial and national politics – as a counter to its perceived 
political disadvantage vis-à-vis Punjab-based business – was now desperate for state 
protection from the MQM.  Voluntary donations had turned into extortion, frequent city-wide 
strikes raised costs and uncertainty, and the rise in violent crime had become a physical threat 
to the business elite and their families.  For the mainstream political parties – in particular the 
PPP, though also the Muslim League – the MQM was a maverick and unreliable bloc that 
negotiated irrationally, and destabilised elected national and provincial governments.  The 
state institutions that had, like the business elite, once encouraged the rise of MQM to reduce 
the influence of mainstream political parties, now perceived a security threat in the 
organisation.  The fact that Karachi was a conduit for much of the country’s foreign trade, and 
a source of the greater proportion of tax-revenue collection, meant that it could not be simply 
handed over to any one political organisation. 
 
The MQM itself had enjoyed such rapid success in imposing its will in the communities 
where it had emerged that it was barely conscious of the fact that it had crossed a line.  The 
incoherent and equivocal law-enforcement efforts from around 1989 onwards might have 
encouraged MQM leaders and supporters to doubt the state’s resolve and ability in 
challenging the party’s rise.  In the event the crackdown between 1993 and 1996 was severe 
and determined.  MQM’s top leadership fled the country and many of its key militant activists 
as well as ordinary members and supporters were killed.  The stranglehold had been broken, 
and apart from human rights activists there were few voices in the political and civil society 
that objected to the repression.  There were signs of disaffection even in the MQM’s core 
constituency among Karachi’s Muhajir communities: frequent strikes and shut downs, rising 
crime and the transformation of voluntary donations into extortion had taken the gloss off the 
party’s image. 
 
The resuscitation of the party in the late 1990s, and then its revival and rehabilitation in 2002, 
were premised on a conspicuous change in nomenclature.  In 1997, after a period of intense 
struggle in which it lost many of its cadres – and inflicted heavy casualties on police and 
civilians alike – the MQM changed its name from Muhajir to Muttahida Quami Movement 
(United National Movement).17  It abandoned the cause of ‘Muhajir nationalism’ in favour of 
a broader cross-ethnic base.  This change, even though it was suspected by some MQM 
detractors as superficial and tactical, did represent a significant rhetorical retreat from the 
days when MQM leaders had encouraged talk of the ‘Muhajir nation’ creating its own nation 
state.  When the party was finally brought back from the cold into government in 2002, it 
made a concerted effort to cultivate sources of funding that were less visible to its political 
constituency than door-to-door extortion visits. 
 
Interestingly, rival parties that had been marginalised through the use of force, including 
assassination of cadres and violent disruption of political activities, were able to revive their 
political positions in Karachi during the very period when the MQM had complete monopoly 
over the government machinery.  Between 2005 and 2007 the city government and the Sindh 
provincial government was controlled by the party, which was also a key stakeholder in the 
national government.  The May 12, 2007 events are regarded as a watershed in this regard, 
                                                 
17 It has been suggested that this change was demanded by powerful players within the state, including the 
military and the secret agencies, as a precondition for protecting party leaders from persecution. 
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when MQM rivals (particularly the PPP and the ANP) showed their ability to resist an all-out 
attempt on the part of the MQM to control the streets.  Other events, such as the city-wide 
shutdown in the aftermath of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, also demonstrated that parties 
other than the MQM could make their presence felt powerfully.  The geography of these 
recent events – in which the city was roughly divided between the centre and the periphery – 
suggests an explanation. 
 
The pace of land acquisition, changes in land use, and regularisation in and around Karachi 
has quickened significantly since around 2001.  Some of the factors are exogenous ones, 
including the rise in property prices, increases in the supply of cash, and the virtual 
integration of Karachi and the rest of Pakistan with the global real estate market.  
Domestically, the revival of the national economy through post-9/11 foreign assistance 
following a period of stagnation released pent-up domestic demand for housing.  In Karachi 
the increased demand for land and housing – or for targets of speculative investment in real 
estate – coincided with the consolidation of city governance into the City District Government 
of Karachi (Interview, Perween Rahman, August 29, 2008).  Another related development 
was the pushing through of a large highway project within the city leading to the 
displacement of some 20,000 homes in irregular settlements (Hasan 2009). 
 
Land acquisition on the part of the government and private developers meant pressure on 
irregular settlements across the city.  The inclusion of outlying areas of Karachi into the 
municipal jurisdiction meant that this pressure now extended to old villages, some of them 
claiming ancestral ownership of land, often without legal title – much in the way of the ethnic 
Sindhis in the Natha Khan case study.  The existing stakeholders and transactors in the 
informal sector include entrepreneurs like Nawaz Khan of Kausar Niazi Colony, and ethnic 
Pashtun land suppliers of Machhar Colony.  The MQM, in the meanwhile, appeared on the 
scene both in the shape of the city government, and despite its change of nomenclature, as an 
ethnic party promoting the interests of ‘its community’.  The resulting contest, like the 
processes of regularisation described above, was one about economic rents and acquired 
ethnic-political overtones.  The ethnic Sindhis, Baloch and Pashtuns in the existing irregular 
settlements within the city, and in the expanding areas in the city’s periphery, were ready 
support bases for the return of major political parties such as the PPP and the ANP.18  These 
parties consolidated the anti-MQM sentiment (and vote) in the non-Muhajir irregular 
settlements within the city, and in the rural/irregular settlements around the periphery. 
 
The factors that had provided an easy entry point for the MQM into many low- and middle-
income areas in Karachi in the 1980s, now worked to the advantage of rival parties in other 
areas.  These parties, whose mobilisation in the past used to be focused on broader provincial 
and national political issues, even if they did invoke regional and ethnic identities, had taken 
MQM’s lead of involving themselves in the internal politics of irregular settlements and 
regularisation.19  The active interface between internal community politics of regularisation 
and national and provincial parties like the PPP and ANP meant, paradoxically, that Karachi’s 
                                                 
18 Among the early signs, well before the May 12 events, was a city-wide peaceful strike (on June 2, 2006)  
called by a coalition of ethnic Sindhi and Pashtun organisations to protest against eviction drives of the city 
government. The mobilisation for this strike portrayed city government actions as attacks on the position of 
particular ethnic communities (Dawn News, June 3, 2006). 
19 Although the PPP was mentioned as a player in the regularisation of the Lines Area and Kausar Niazi Colony, 
its role was a relatively distant one.  Local land suppliers or community leaders had used their connections with 
the PPP leadership, and even more remotely, the government had taken the populist decision to announce 
regularisation.  The micro-process of regularisation, however, had not then been owned by the party.  The anti-
MQM consolidation of recent years, therefore, was a new development. 
 31
political life was once again making an entry into the national mainstream.  Unlike the MQM, 
these other parties had wider ethnic bases that were not limited to Karachi.  Whether, and to 
what extent, the emerging political situation will take Karachi back towards violent political 
and ethnic conflict remains to be seen. 
 
Finally, it is pertinent to ask if the institutional approach to understanding conflict and 
violence in Karachi has anything to say about the process of pulling away from the brink.  If 
non-state violence and informal social networks are legitimised because they facilitate 
informal economic transactions, is there a counter process of delegitimisation of actions that 
disrupt economic activity? There is a sense that this is what happened in the 1990s, when the 
MQM was seen to have gone too far.  Former supporters in the state apparatus and in the 
business elite backed away when the renegotiation of economic rents threatened to damage 
the very basis of economic activity in the city.  Supportive communities also appeared 
unwilling to sustain economic disruption.  The social acceptance of non-state violence was 
easier to justify as long as it was based on the facilitation of illegal yet legitimate economic 
transactions. Similar pressures appeared to operate on the political leaderships on all sides 
during recent instances of city-wide violence, which were brought under control before they 
could escalate into wider political or ethnic conflict. 
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Annex 1: Statistics on Violence in Karachi 
 
 
Killings in Karachi 1994-2004 
Source: Unpublished data provided to the authors by the Citizens Police Liaison Committee (CPLC), and 
authors’ compilation from annual reports of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
 















HRCP annual reports Data for Sectarian Violence 
Source: Authors’ compilation from annual reports of the HRCP 
 
Year Killed in Sectarian Violence Identified as Shia 
1994 57 49 
1995 74 56 
1996 14  
1997 165 95 (6 doctors) 
1998 6  
1999 110 68 (3 doctors) 
2000 18 (8 doctors) 
2001 86  
2002 90 9 doctors 
2003 22  










Breakdown of Killings (in Karachi) compiled from HRCP reports 
Source: Authors’ compilation from annual reports of the HRCP 
 
Breakdown of killings 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Killed in sniper firing 441 587 155 142  
Target killings 48 30 
Torture inflicted by non state actors 162 238 130   
Police Encounters 44 76 89  36 
Staged Encounters 19 NA 57   
Death in police custody 22 36 NA   
Others killed (bomb blasts etc) 34 44 13  
Law enforcing personnel killed 65 30   
Women and Children 144 98   
Total 682 1178 546 452 203 66 
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Annex 2: Election Outcomes in Karachi, Sindh and Pakistan 
 
Ethnic Overtones in Support for Political Parties 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 























































National assembly elections 2008: 
Party seats  
MQM 5 5 1 3 3 17 
PPP 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Total 5 5 2 4 4 20 
Vote share (per cent)  
MQM 91.6 77.1 42.1 47.4 60.1 69.5 
PPP 7.3 18.3 50.9 39.0 27.8 23.9 
Provincial assembly elections 2008: 
Party seats 
ANP   1  1 2 
MQM 10 12 1 5 6 34 
PPP   2 2 2 6 
Total 10 12 4 7 9 42 
Vote share (per cent) 
ANP 0.0 0.0 9.2 0.1 6.1 2.2 
MQM 82.1 80.8 31.8 41.6 59.3 66.2 
PPP 5.7 12.6 48.4 43.4 26.5 21.6 
 
Political Parties in Power at the Local, Provincial and National Level 
 
Year Karachi Sindh Pakistan 
2001 Jamat e Islami Military Govt. Military Govt. 
2002 Jamat e Islami PML and MQM PML 
2003 Jamat e Islami PML and MQM PML 
2004 Jamat e Islami PML and MQM PML 
2005 MQM PML and MQM PML and MQM 
2006 MQM PML and MQM PML and MQM 
2007 MQM PML and MQM PML and MQM 
2008 MQM PPP, ANP, MQM PPP, PML, ANP 
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Annex 3: Details on Fieldwork Localities 
Amenities and infrastructure 
Source: Authors’ fieldwork 
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Data on fieldwork localities and corresponding census localities, towns and disricts 
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